PUTIN: HOPES AND RESERVATIONS

And so Putin.

The election results didn't surprise anybody. In present-day Russia the result could not have been different. For the first time since the period of perestroika of the 80s, in the top-echelon of administrators there appeared a person widely supported by the population, in various factions of the Duma and even by the disappointed intelligentsia. Almost everybody declares their love for him. Putin is praised by the Kremlin, which quite understandable since he is looked upon as its hope and support. Local and regional leaders also support Putin. He is admired by the corps officers. He impressed the Moscow elite by his attention to detail, foreign leaders - by his knowledge of languages (good English and perfect German), western bankers - by his pragmatism in discussing financial issues and problems of corruption.

Within a couple of months marked by unexpected trips and turbulent activity he came across as a firm and decisive leader who was long-awaited by the country after a decade of inertness and dissolution. No wonder that when Boris Yeltsin was dropping his ballot into a ballot-box he said: "The people want changes." With this key phrase the former president involuntary explained the phenomenon of "putinomania".

A great number of people have heard from him what they have long wanted to hear. What is more, they have heard not from the communists but from the power, that the vital and painful problems which the former power did not manage to tackle must be addressed.

It is impossible to say what the future will be like. However, the key vector has been determined. The political climate is likely to be calmer. The time of public fights, sky-rocketing careers, torrent downfalls is over :

Not only have the numeric results of the election in Russia defined a new president, but they also have demonstrated the hopes and reservations with which the Russians enter a new millennium and what kind of expectations they associate with Vladimir Putin.

There is no uniform public opinion in the Russian society today. And this is a unique feature of the present time. Many expect Putin to end the Chechen war. Others, on the contrary, expect him to continue a hard line in the Caucasus. Pro-western ones believe that with Putin liberal reforms in Russia will be accelerated, and the market mechanism will work to its full capacity. On the other hand, the anti-western part of Russian society also link their hopes with him. These people believe that Russia will become a rigidly centralized state regulating all economic and political processes.

According to sociologists from the Agency for Regional Political Surveys, over one third of Russians believe that V. Putin as president will change the country's policy for the better. Slightly fewer citizens think that he will generally continue the policy of the first president of Russia. At the same time, 39% of respondents assume that Putin as president will continue the former course of reforms. 34% of Russians hope that he will carry out reforms with a focus on social security of the population. And only 2% of the participants in the poll think that Vladimir Putin "will turn back to socialism" ("The Trud-7", 58, 2000).

What do Russians think of the new president's attitudes towards the key socio-political issues?

Perhaps the most acute issue is the situation in Chechnya. Despite the official statement of the generals on terminating warfare, the combat operations continue and the losses in the Russian troops grow.

It is a well known fact that the rating of V. Putin grew mostly due to an unseen uplifting of patriotic spirit in the country. And this uplifting was accounted for by the victories in Chechnya. Until recently, politologists incorrectly assumed that patriotism was the domain of communists and "left-wingers". Admittedly, patriotic spirit has always predominated in Russian people. However, until the anti-terrorist operation it was mostly expressed in the form of bitterness about numerous losses "in all fronts": the collapse of the Union, multiple humiliations on the international arena, etc. Now the Russians are given a chance for psychological victory.

The people saw in Putin a long awaited "strong hand". A survey carried out by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Study (VCIOM) to commemorate the 120th anniversary of I. Stalin's birth also proves this. 44% of respondents admit that the Stalin period did good to the country as well as bad, 19% think that it did more good than bad, and 3% believe that the Stalin period did only good. All in all, it totals to 66% ("The Trud-7", 6.01.2000). The figures speak for themselves.

Having seen decisive Putin and having heard his brusque way of speaking about Chechen terrorists, people decided that he was that "solid power" about which they have been dreaming for so long. Their dream was somehow "imposed on" the personality of Putin. He understood this and tried to meet the demand. But in order to succeed he needs constant and continuous success.

Unfortunately, the set tasks in Chechnya were not resolved quickly. There are quite a lot of people who criticize the government's policies in this region. One of the candidates for presidency in the recent elections, the leader of "Yabloko" faction Grigory Yavlinsky, openly declares that the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya started by Putin has not achieved its goals and has turned into a full-scale warfare which is not adequately substantiated by legal provisions and a program of political settlement.

The people start thinking about the costs at which a break in the situation in the North Caucasus is achieved. Against several thousands of terrorists Putin fielded the best resources of the Armed Forces: from sea-soldiers and paratroopers to the best squads of SOBR (commandos). The military alignment in the region totals to one hundred thousand people, which is 5 times more in manpower let alone the supremacy in weaponry.

"We are involving ourselves in a lingering war. And what shall we do when the popularity of the idea of punishing 'the malicious Chechens' fades out?" asks a well known human rights advocate Sergei Kovalev. "How many more costs in lives will the pleasure of having a very popular Mr. Putin require?" Evidently, the majority is for putting an end to war as soon as possible. Putin is expected to come with a well balanced, humane but at the same time reliable and irreversible political solution to the war conflict in the Caucasus.

In no way is the economic aspect of Putin's activity as president of the country a less burning and acute problem. It is in this area that most people seek changes. Many people understand that they can not live like this any longer. Neither live, nor work. The country is the richest in the world in terms of material and intellectual resources, while its people, if everything is left without changing, will soon become the poorest in the world. Understanding this, Putin even during the election campaign did not give any bright promises and admitted that Russia's lag is so great that it will take at least 20 years in order to catch up with not even the most developed countries, but those that follow them.

If the common voter is full of expectations for rapid changes, a number of experts suppose that Putin's economic outlook was and still is the most vulnerable. From Putin's letter addressing the electorate the common Russian man could learn that Putin's priorities are "fighting against our own poverty", and "protection of the market from unlawful interference of officials". However, as far as we recall, Putin promised that he will have not only a formal program but a document which will be a guideline for the government for the next several years. So far this document is under work. It is likely to appear in May or possibly later.

Perhaps it is wrong to say that the absence of the program is demonstrating disrespect to voters. One should begin thinking about a something else - why is Putin unable so far to say anything intelligible about his economic plans. There can be several answers to this question.

First - out of tactical reasons: he did not want to give information to his political opponents beforehand since in any directive document errors can be easily spotted and used for the purpose of propaganda.

Another alternative. Putin has taken over seriously and for a long time. The problems are known and are not to be addressed hastily. What is more, they can not be tackled without consideration of important external factors. It is likely that in the spring and summer Putin and his team will carefully build up the pyramid of the executive power, the relations with the parliament and regional leaders. Probably economic strategies will be designed and implemented by the new Cabinet.

There can be a third point view: he does not know yet what to do with all this overwhelming power over the Russian economy that descended on him.

In such a situation there is nothing left but to hope that the credit given to Putin by the Russians will enable him to select players for his team on professional rather than political grounds.

He should call for professionals who share his outlook, hardworking, result-oriented, interested in reinforcing the Russian state, spotless in their deeds as well as their thoughts.

The attitude of the Russians towards Putin, their hopes and reservations have been and will be determined by how independently he acts. Will he be able to stop political factions and consolidate power? Will he manage to break away from obtrusive oligarchs and "family" courtiers?

His ability to maneuver well was already demonstrated by Putin during his first months in the Kremlin. He constantly demonstrated that he does not want to fight anybody except the Chechen terrorists, on the contrary, he actively reconciled conflicting groups. A good example of this is the "scandal in the Duma", i.e. the agreement between the CPRF (communist party)and Edinstvo on the distribution of posts in the State Duma. According to professor of MGIMO MID RF V. Mironov, this was Putin's greatest success which almost ensured opening the way to the presidency to him. (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4.02.2000). In fact, it was a large-scale political trade: communists got the Parliament in the form of its speaker, and Putin got presidency.

This incident gave cause not only to his opponents but also his supporters to demand Putin to express his "ideological credo". Such demands can be explained by the wish to attribute Putin to a certain section of the ideological spectrum in order to bring the political process into the accustomed framework of the struggle between "communists" and "democrats", which was more than enough under Yeltsin, and society is tired of it.

So far Putin has managed to avoid this kind of confrontation. Unlike many other political leaders in Russia, he is a communicator rather than an ideologist, i.e. not only does he listen to the public opinion, but, as his election campaign has demonstrated, also actively uses it in his work.

It may be asserted that a large part of Russian society is not interested in whether Putin is a "democrat" or an "autocrat". The polls carried out at the beginning of the year prove that only 9% of the respondents are attracted to Putin by his loyalty to democratic values, and only 3% apprehend the danger of dictatorship emanated by him (The Obschaya Gazeta, 5, 2000).

Putin's position as president gives Russians a hope that he will be able to develop the accord which has started building up in society recently on a number of key issues: the growth of the role of the government in economics and some other spheres of life; creating order in the country; moderate anti-western attitudes; the necessity of changes in the political and economic regime built in the 90s; a general market approach to economic reforms with rehabilitating ideas of social justice.

Today the Russians can't help asking themselves: will Putin have enough will, insistence and ability to solve a backlog of problems, will he be carried away by temptation to use wide-scale public support in order to reinforce his personal power? Or will society, supported by him, be able to consolidate around the goals vital for the country?

One thing goes without saying: if the problem in Chechnya is not resolved, if the economic outlook does not clear up, if the living standards do not improve, and finally, if the real struggle against corruption does not start, the hopes and expectations of the Russians associated with Putin's election may change dramatically. Simply the stock of people's trust has been already exhausted.