REFORM OF POWER: MERITS AND FLAWS

	Introduction A reform of the administrative power system in Russia has been a long-standing need. The logic of the Kremlin here is quite simple: to impair or fully incapacitate the autonomous centers of political power that endanger or may endanger the implementation of the strategy of reinforcement of the federal power and strengthening the integrity of the state. Measures for "disciplining" the Duma, governors, oligarchs and especially their politically active media holdings have been undertaken one after another and sometimes simultaneously. At first glance, there is nothing special in the battles between the Kremlin and regional leaders, which have become sort of historical. In any country central and regional authorities compete with each other. Each side pursues benefits for itself. The competition is won by the party which is politically stronger at the moment. The fact that the center is dominating at present is not surprising - Putin is stronger now. However, this issue in Russia has a special feature. Following the unwise advice of B. Yeltsin, regional authorities "have swallowed" more sovereignty than demanded by the state interests. We should have learned from the collapse of the USSR that loosing control over the subjects of the Federation results in separatism and can lead to the disintegration of the country. That is why the reform of the power launched in Russia today can be affirmed as an inevitable necessity.
	What caused it? It is not a secret that over the last ten years Russia has been rebuilding itself. The center interfered in the process of "self-building" only when it was impossible not to interfere. For instance, when there already was a certain "sovereign" part of the country which was about to raise its anchor, an agreement was concluded with it and special benefits were granted; or when "subdivisions" of a large region declared war on each other, and it was necessary to separate them urgently, interference occurred. Being separated, they were granted equal rights, and subjects of the Federation were generated by gemmation. Some considered themselves to be a state within the state, some - a national territorial formation, others were content just with a status of a gubernia. Consequently, we ended up with 89 sovereign regions, 89 "untouchable" leaders and elected city mayors, heads of village councils, etc. subordinate to them. All of who defer only to "the will of the people." They don't defer to each other and by no means to the Center. We have created a situation when all levels - the Center and territories, regional and local authorities, lawmakers - have started competing with each other for powers. Those who benefited from chaos and arbitrary rule have watched their self-exterminating struggle. Paralysis of power has lead to the seizure of state functions by private corporations and clans. The weakness of the state has thinned down economic and other reforms.
	And what about nonconformity of laws? The heads of national republics have especially neglected the Russian Constitution. For instance, Bashkortostan, Yakutia, Komi and Tyva have endowed themselves with the right to suspend laws and regulations of the Russian Federation if they contradict their own constitution or laws. Buryatia, Komi, Tyva, Bashkortostan, Kalmykia, Karelia, Northern Osetia and Ingushetia think that they may proclaim emergency on their territories without consenting the Center. More over, Tyva has endowed itself the right to proclaim martial law on its territory and adopt decisions of war and peace. Tyva, Yakutia and Ingushetia have declared natural resources of their territories to be their property…. Governors have followed the example set by the heads of sovereign territories. In Saratov Oblast, for example, a referendum can "back-pedal" federal regulations if they contradicted local laws or just "interests of the population of the gubernia". According to the Russian Constitution, external policy is made by the federal Center exclusively. However, some regional bosses were unable to put up with that. Leaders of Dagestan, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Tyva, Ingushetia, Komi, Krasnodarsky Krai, Sverdlovsk and Novgorod Oblast have all taken the liberty of concluding international agreements. Regional leaders have also trespassed on the powers of federal agencies. Thus, in 19 subjects of the RF, Security Councils have been established. Ministries of defense of Tatarstan, Khakasia, Karelia, Mariy El, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria tried to control local subdivisions of federal security and defense agencies. Let alone different "little things" like legalizing polygamy in Ingushetia, declaring the English language as the official language in Yakutia , trying to inflict capital punishment for drug abuse in Omsk Oblast, etc. Until now whatever attempts to bring to account local hot shots that have been made failed. Several attempts were made to restrain Kirsan Ilyumzhinov who either held elections with one single candidate on the ballot or transferred the federal funds abroad via the local bank…. The initiators of the administrative reform have also looked at it as a powerful tool of fighting against the red-tape. Functionaries stifle any initiative with bribery. On the other hand, large corporations and financial-industrial groups have practically privatized the state and turned it into their watchdog who safeguards them from any competition. Laws were not applicable to the power-holders. However, in order to make everyone equal before the law, the state must become more powerful and stronger. Strong and powerful enough to make all the oligarchs respect it. The necessity to reform the executive power has also been caused by such an important factor as establishment of clear relationships between the federal, regional and local authorities. We should resolve the issue of "state integrity," otherwise problems like Chechnia will expand nationwide. Behind the task of strengthening the power structure we can clearly see other tasks to be addressed: establishing order in the country, fighting against corruption, drain of money, etc. The President has already deprived governors of the uncharacteristic functions of national lawmakers in the Federation Council, introduced a mechanism of federal interference in the affairs of regional barons, achieved more conformity between local laws and the Russian Constitution. Regions are now under additional supervision of "the tzar's unsleeping eye" embodied in presidential representatives in seven newly formed counties, and the revenues will be redistributed more in favor of federal authorities. The power structure is getting stronger before our eyes.
	Who is opposed? However, not everybody was content with the steps undertaken by Vladimir Putin to firm up the sagging power structure. Some political forces interpreted these actions as pursuit of autocracy by president. Some saw it as a refusal of the state to fulfill its social duties (a sort of social default), others saw it as a wish to strip regions financially and thus "to tame" them… Resistance to reforms in certain instances was even expressed in organized forms. Take Boris Berezovsky's defiant statements and his threats to create the nucleus of a new opposition party from among regional governors. Regional leaders did not understand that the new president is not looking for personal loyalty and will not only fight against certain "disobedient" individuals but the entire vicious system. The resistance to the president's line has its cost. And the cost is by no means low. There are many examples. Thus, in order to impose control over the cash flows of investments in construction the government insists on banning VAT privileges, including the one which doesn't allow VAT to be charged on housing construction if the share of budgetary or off-budgetary funds invested in it is less than 40%. What is behind this intent of the government? Of course, first of all, the establishment of strict federal control over the cash flow. It is a well known fact that the funds in regions are not used for its assigned purpose. The protest was expressed especially loudly by oligarch financial-industrial groups, represented by B. Berezovsky. When he abnegated his powers of a deputy of the State Duma, he said that "he did not want to participate in the establishment of autocracy and the breakdown of Russia". According to some politologists, the leading role of Berezovsky in the oligarch sector of "new opposition" may be explained in several ways. As it is well known, he is used to benefit not so much from having "direct physical access" to key decision-makers, as from his talent to fish in the troubled waters of mismanagement. The "system chaos" for him is the most comfortable habitat. Now, as Saltykov-Schedrin put it, Boris Abramovich Berezovsky is doing his best to play the role of a clever Jew in waiting of a governor. Enforcing order in the country gives a death blow to the business of Boris Abramovich, and refusal to follow his advice hits his pride.
	Steering a middle course A lot of constructive critique can be heard from opponents of Putin's reform. Some think that in a flurry of fighting with regional self-will, one should not forget about running into another possible problem for the federation - excessive centralization. In such a huge country as Russia excessive centralization is as harmful as regional arbitrariness. When "tightening the screws," it is very easy to trespass the line beyond which the Federation will collapse. As the world practices demonstrate, centralized control is not necessarily more effective in terms of economics, government, defense, providing for social and other rights of citizens. The super-centralized USSR turned out to be weaker in all respects than the decentralized US. Unitarian societies rigidly controlled from the center have a number of flaws. All conflicts and manifestations of dissatisfaction there are directly addressed to the capital, which leads to quickly dwindling central power and eventually to the development of the same separatism. In this situation regional leaders lose accountability and initiative. Self-government degrades; the local elite is not formed since serious people do not wish to serve as a governor who can not make decisions. In addition, in multinational countries unitarianism generates ethnic conflicts. Even in the Russian Empire called "the prison of the nations," national territories enjoyed significant autonomy and were allowed to pass their own laws which often differed from the national legislation considerably. Some governors and politicians point out the contradictory nature of the power centralization process. According to them, in Russia now only political power is being centralized, which is not enough to control such a huge country. Administrative efforts should be complimented with a vital nationwide system based on economy. Many people think that now in Russia there are only two options - the authoritarianism of the Kremlin and authoritarianism of regional princes. The leader of the Duma faction Regions of Russia, O. Morozov, asserts that authoritarianism of regional leaders does not exist in a direct sense. And with what is it possible to fight within the framework of laws. Yeltsin just did not posses enough political will for that. Putin has more than enough of it. If he sets this task before him, he has the chance to do away with regional self-will. Morozov thinks that a president's authoritarianism is more dangerous. The Constitution invests the president with enormous powers that have become even stronger now. And no man can be invested with uncontrolled wide authority. The steps undertaken by the president demonstrate that a weak link has been detected - if governors are straightened out, everything will go right. This means that from a great number of political, economic and power players infringing on the law only one was selected and made the "scapegoat." At least the politician G. Satarov thinks so. Governors are also of the same opinion. A decision to set up the State Council also did not get unanimous support by politicians and politicians. Most severely this body has been criticized by a deputy of the State Duma, V. Ryzhkov, who calls it a state ghost that appears each time when the power tries to imitate a representative branch. V. Ryzhkov supports his opinion by the fact that setting up the State Council indirectly indicates that the Kremlin admits a mistake was made when reforming the Federation Council. The upper chamber, in his opinion, was an important mechanism of feedback between the center and regions. Once or twice a month when senators assembled in Moscow, they had an opportunity to speak to president directly, and it was a perfect way to learn about what was happening in the Russian provinces. The absence of governors in the Federation Council will destroy this feedback. The appointment of the president's representatives in seven newly formed counties has also been attacked bluntly. One of the authors of the Declaration of the Group of Nine, V. Aksenov, a writer, thinks that formation of seven strong provinces may lead to a conflict of power elites both at the regional level and in the Center. V. Aksenov asserts that people in the provinces have never liked Moscow. One should bear in mind purely traditional Russian problems - theft and corruption. Now we are generating a new powerful horde of officials, but who can guarantee that they will be more honest than their predecessors? The greatest opponent to the president's envoys is the president of Chuvashia, N. Fedorov. He believes that the president's representatives in regions do not assist in strengthening the power structure, as it was intended by the authors of this idea, but that they destroy the constitutional power system in the country instead. In his opinion, this additional superstructure will increase the number of bureaucrats and consequently, the expenses on their allowance. N. Fedorov is especially concerned by the fact that the FSB and bureaucracy were selected to rely upon in managing the country. He is also concerned by the rate of militarization of Russian politics. He thinks that the armed forces and politics are different trades. Generals are used to obeying orders, which is good. But they are not used to being accountable for a situation. Moreover, bearing in mind the lessons of the recent past, society should be more careful about appointing militant generals and former KGB officers to fill the highest posts. We have briefly reviewed the different positions regarding the most significant issue to Russia currently. All in all, most people are for the reform. Many think that it is important to steer a middle course between extremes of regional anarchy and super-centralization, and to set up an effective system of interaction between the center and regions, taking into account their interests. President of the Politica Fund V. Nikonov thinks that to achieve this goal it is necessary to continue reforming the Federation Council and not allow regional leaders to appoint its members, but to allow the people to elect them and make them accountable to the people. It would be useful to establish federal district courts in seven new counties that will mainly deal with the contradictions between the laws of the regions of the Federation and the national legislation. We should not reject the federal structure of the state. We should refine it.